Nigeria’s evolving security challenges require a coordinated strategy that connects military operations with intelligence, technology, community engagement and credible public communication, former Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Tukur Yusufu Buratai has argued, placing the future of national security beyond battlefield engagements alone.
Desk: Defence & Security
Date: 13 October 2026
Time: 07:00 WAT
Location: Abuja, FCT
Author: Nokai Origin
Buratai presented this position at the Defence Correspondents Association of Nigeria (DECAN) Annual Lecture and Awards Ceremony in Abuja on 12 October 2026, where he received the Distinguished Leadership Award in recognition of his leadership of the Nigerian Army, his role in the counterinsurgency campaign and his contributions to national security during his tenure as Chief of Army Staff.
His address, titled Beyond Kinetic Warfare: Harnessing Technology and Intelligence-Led Operations for Nigeria’s National Security, drew on his experience leading the Army from July 2015 to January 2021, a period marked by major military campaigns against Boko Haram and continuing debate over the effectiveness, accountability and wider consequences of Nigeria’s security response. The Nigerian Army’s official record confirms his tenure during those years.
The recognition
therefore placed both his operational record and his wider argument about the
changing character of warfare at the centre of a national security discussion
involving military institutions, intelligence agencies, government and the
media.
The Buratai Years:
Territorial Recovery and the Limits of Military Force
Buratai’s address
revisited the scale of the Boko Haram insurgency when he assumed command in
2015, recalling communities emptied by violence, disrupted commercial centres
and settlements that had become inaccessible to residents. His account of
visiting Buni Yadi and other affected areas illustrated how the conflict had
extended beyond military positions to undermine ordinary life, local economies
and confidence in state authority.
He argued that the
recovery of territory during the period depended on sustained military
pressure, improved operational planning and more systematic intelligence. The
Nigerian Army and other security services carried out extensive operations
under Operation Lafiya Dole, while the Multinational Joint Task Force provided
a regional framework for confronting the cross-border insurgency. Government
records from the period documented the recapture of towns and villages, the
reopening of important roads and the rescue of civilians from terrorist
captivity. These gains reflected the work of the wider Armed Forces and
regional partners, rather than the actions of a single commander alone.
Buratai described the expansion of specialised military capabilities, the development of Army aviation and special operations, improvements in equipment and the promotion of indigenous defence production as important elements of the Army’s transformation during his tenure.
He also pointed to the development of
intelligence capacity and the use of operations against insurgents’ logistical
networks as part of a more systematic campaign.
The strategic lesson
he drew was that territorial recovery remains essential, but it cannot by
itself guarantee lasting security. Military advances must be consolidated
through functioning civil authority, the restoration of livelihoods, community
confidence and measures that reduce the conditions in which violent groups can
recruit and operate.
That distinction is
central to the national security debate. Nigeria has recorded significant
operational gains against insurgent groups, yet the persistence of attacks,
displacement and insecurity across different regions demonstrates that
battlefield progress must be matched by durable political, social and
institutional outcomes.
Why Kinetic Warfare
Cannot Secure the Peace Alone
Buratai made the
distinction between defeating armed opponents in combat and resolving the wider
environment that sustains violence a central argument of his lecture. Kinetic
operations, including military manoeuvres and air support, remain necessary where
armed groups threaten civilians, seize territory or challenge state authority.
Their strategic value, however, diminishes when security operations are not
accompanied by efforts to restore community life and disrupt the economic and
social networks that sustain conflict.
He cited an example
from Borno State in which tensions between local residents and settlers had
generated distrust and distorted the flow of intelligence. According to his
account, a military commander brought traditional leaders together, arranged
safer access to farmland and helped communities address practical livelihood
concerns. The resulting cooperation improved the environment for intelligence
sharing and reduced opportunities for insurgents to exploit local grievances.
The example
illustrated Buratai’s wider argument that communities should be treated as
participants in security rather than merely as populations living around
military operations. Where residents believe their safety and livelihoods
matter to security institutions, cooperation becomes more credible. Where
grievances remain unresolved, armed groups can exploit fear, distrust and
economic vulnerability.
He also discussed
rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for former insurgents, including
Operation Safe Corridor, as part of the non-kinetic dimension of
counterinsurgency. Such programmes remain difficult because they raise
questions about public confidence, the treatment of victims, the assessment of
individual risks and the prospects for genuine rehabilitation. Buratai
acknowledged that reintegration requires sustained attention to community trust
and the possibility of recidivism.
His position was that
military pressure can create space for political and social solutions, but it
cannot substitute for them. The durability of security gains depends on whether
state institutions can turn cleared areas into places where civilians can safely
return, work and rebuild their lives.
Technology and
Intelligence Must Become an Integrated National Capability
A major feature of
Buratai’s address was his call for a shift from fragmented information
gathering towards an integrated command-and-control architecture capable of
supporting decisions across strategic, operational and tactical levels.
He discussed the
proposed national intelligence-driven command, control, communications,
computers and intelligence architecture, commonly described as C4I, as an
important step towards connecting information from different sensors and
operational platforms. He argued that a more integrated system could improve
situational awareness, shorten the time between detecting a threat and
responding to it, and give commanders a more complete picture of developing
security situations.
Buratai also
highlighted the potential contribution of artificial intelligence, unmanned
systems and data integration to surveillance and reconnaissance, particularly
in areas where difficult terrain and dispersed criminal networks make
conventional patrols costly and challenging. He stressed, however, that
technical intelligence should complement rather than replace human
intelligence.
Information gathered
through technology can help identify activity, but local knowledge remains
essential for interpreting what that activity means, understanding community
dynamics and assessing the consequences of intervention. In this framework,
technological investment becomes most valuable when it is connected to trained
personnel, reliable analysis and effective interagency cooperation.
Buratai urged the
government to develop domestic expertise for operating, maintaining and
sustaining advanced systems, rather than allowing strategic capabilities to
remain dependent on foreign suppliers. He also called for a more operational
intelligence-fusion structure linking the military, police, intelligence
agencies and financial intelligence institutions.
The wider implication
is that national security technology should be treated as an enduring
institutional capability, not simply as an equipment procurement exercise. Its
value will depend on interoperability, maintenance, training, data governance
and the ability of Nigerian personnel to adapt systems to the country’s
distinct security requirements.
Intelligence-Led
Operations Shift the Focus from Symptoms to Networks
Drawing on his
experience as Chief of Army Staff, Buratai explained how intelligence-led
operations could weaken insurgent groups by focusing on the networks that
enable them to function. He recalled efforts during 2019 and 2020 to improve
the tracking of supply lines supporting Boko Haram, including the networks
through which fighters obtained food, fuel and other necessities.
His argument was that
armed groups may conceal individual fighters, but sustaining an insurgency
requires relationships, supplies, movement and communication. Understanding
those connections can help security agencies identify vulnerabilities and make
their operations more precise.
Buratai also recalled
studying Colombia’s experience with a prolonged insurgency and said lessons
from the country reinforced the importance of technical intelligence and
identifying support networks. He linked those lessons to efforts to strengthen
the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps and improve coordination with other
security institutions.
Yet intelligence-led
security depends on more than surveillance technology. It requires credible
sources, analytical skill, legal authority, effective information sharing and
trust between security agencies and the public. Buratai acknowledged that inadequate
equipment, limited resources and weak cooperation had complicated intelligence
work, while arguing that institutional improvements could help overcome these
obstacles.
He called for the
further strengthening of intelligence fusion arrangements, including
coordination among the Defence Intelligence Agency, Department of State
Services, National Intelligence Agency, police and other relevant bodies. He
also stressed that intelligence gathering should be connected to community
engagement, because residents who trust security institutions can provide
information that technical systems alone cannot supply.
The policy challenge
is to build an intelligence system that is timely and coordinated while
remaining subject to appropriate legal safeguards, oversight and
accountability.
DECAN and the
Media’s Place in National Security
Buratai’s strongest
institutional message to the audience concerned the role of defence
correspondents in shaping public understanding of security operations. He
described the media as a strategic dimension of security governance, with
responsibilities extending beyond reporting battlefield developments to public
education, accountability, peacebuilding and the verification of information.
He recalled that,
during the Boko Haram campaign, the group used recorded attacks and propaganda
to project strength and undermine confidence in the Nigerian military. In his
assessment, the military could achieve operational gains while losing public confidence
if its activities remained poorly explained or if adversaries dominated the
information environment.
That concern informed
the embedded-journalist model introduced during his tenure. Buratai said
defence correspondents were given access to frontline units and affected
communities so that they could observe military operations, speak to soldiers
and civilians, and report what they witnessed. He insisted that the intention
was not to script their reports or control their conclusions, but to give
journalists access to realities that could not be adequately understood from
distant official statements.
He credited the model
with helping to humanise Nigerian soldiers, challenge insurgent propaganda,
document the consequences of violence and build a more informed relationship
between the military and the public. He also acknowledged that journalists sometimes
reported operational shortcomings, supply problems and allegations of
misconduct. For him, such scrutiny was part of the credibility that the model
was intended to establish.
Buratai described
DECAN as part of the institutional legacy of that experience, congratulating
the association on its conference and urging it to deepen specialised defence
reporting. He proposed regular training and engagement between journalists and
security agencies, including quarterly seminars and a standing forum where both
sides could address grievances and establish practical reporting protocols.
The distinction he
drew between security-conscious journalism and security-controlled journalism
is significant. Operational safety can require caution around sensitive
information, but national security cannot become a blanket justification for
restricting legitimate reporting. Journalists need sufficient independence to
investigate official conduct, examine public spending and report matters of
public interest, while security institutions need responsible reporting that
avoids unverified claims and the careless amplification of violent groups’
propaganda.
In an environment
increasingly shaped by manipulated images, deepfakes and rapidly circulating
social media content, verification has become a critical part of public
resilience. Buratai’s argument placed a shared responsibility on both sides:
the military must communicate accurately and provide appropriate access, while
journalists must verify claims and retain the independence necessary to
scrutinise power.
Accountability,
Procurement and the Need for a Verifiable Record
Buratai devoted a
substantial part of the lecture to controversies surrounding his tenure,
including allegations linked to a US$1 billion defence procurement allocation
and concerns over alleged human rights violations during counterinsurgency
operations. He argued that public criticism must be directed towards the
institutions responsible for particular decisions and that allegations should
be assessed against verifiable records.
On the procurement
issue, he maintained that the funds in question were approved through the
National Economic Council and handled by the Federal Ministry of Defence,
rather than passing through the accounts of the Army, Navy or Air Force. He
said the absence of adequate public explanation from the institution
responsible for the procurement process had allowed allegations to remain
attached to service chiefs.
Those statements
represent Buratai’s account of the controversy. Establishing responsibility
requires access to the relevant approval documents, disbursement records,
contracts, audit findings and other evidence. The broader governance lesson is
that major security expenditure must be accompanied by clear documentation and
appropriate oversight, particularly where public confidence is at stake.
He also addressed the
International Criminal Court’s examination of alleged crimes committed during
the conflict, maintaining that credible allegations must be investigated and,
where substantiated, prosecuted. He argued that accountability mechanisms should
be communicated more clearly so that the public can understand how military
institutions address misconduct.
The legal context
requires careful distinction. In December 2020, the ICC Office of the
Prosecutor concluded its preliminary examination of the situation in Nigeria,
finding a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes and crimes against
humanity had been committed by Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces. That
finding was not a final judicial determination of the guilt of particular
individuals. The ICC’s published record also confirms that Nigeria and the
Office of the Prosecutor concluded a memorandum of understanding on 26 March
2026 to strengthen cooperation and complementarity, with Nigeria retaining
primary responsibility for genuine national investigations and prosecutions.
These issues reinforce
the importance of independent scrutiny and credible domestic accountability.
The abuses committed by insurgent groups do not remove the obligation to
investigate alleged wrongdoing by state personnel, just as allegations against
security personnel should not erase the suffering of civilians or the
sacrifices of soldiers. A trustworthy historical record must be capable of
holding both realities together.
Buratai’s appeal to
the media was therefore two-sided. He argued that reporting should provide the
full context of the conflict, including insurgent violence and the sacrifices
of military personnel, while also insisting that the media must investigate institutional
conduct and pursue questions that powerful organisations may prefer to avoid.
From Conference
Recommendations to Security Reform
Buratai concluded with
a set of proposals aimed at making Nigeria’s security institutions more
integrated, sustainable and publicly accountable. They included strengthening
intelligence fusion, providing predictable funding for non-kinetic operations
and civil-military cooperation, building local technological and maintenance
capacity, and investing in community intelligence networks.
He also urged DECAN to
work with Defence Headquarters and the Office of the National Security Adviser
on regular training for security reporters. Other recommendations included
reviewing the five-year strategic defence plan, improving transparency around
procurement, communicating military accountability procedures more proactively
and establishing a standing media-military dialogue forum that meets quarterly.
These proposals point
towards a wider institutional challenge: Nigeria must connect the different
elements of national security into a system capable of responding to complex
and changing threats. Better technology will have limited value without reliable
intelligence and skilled personnel. Military operations will struggle to
deliver lasting stability without community confidence and functioning public
institutions. Official communication will remain unconvincing where
transparency and accountability are weak.
The effectiveness of
the proposed reforms will ultimately depend on implementation, adequate
funding, clear responsibilities and measurable results. Regular reviews should
establish whether intelligence sharing has improved, whether local communities
are safer, whether technology is being sustained domestically and whether
security institutions are responding credibly to allegations of misconduct.
The Strategic
Meaning of Buratai’s DECAN Recognition
DECAN’s Distinguished
Leadership Award recognised Buratai’s military leadership and his role during a
consequential period in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign. His lecture
extended that recognition into a broader argument about how the country should
understand security in an era when physical operations, intelligence,
technology and public information increasingly influence one another.
His central
proposition was that security cannot be sustained by military force alone.
Kinetic operations create space for stability, non-kinetic measures help
address the conditions sustaining conflict, technology improves operational
effectiveness, intelligence supports anticipation and prioritisation, and
credible communication builds public understanding and trust.
That framework offers
a useful basis for evaluating future security policy, provided that its
promises are tested against evidence and implementation. Nigeria’s experience
has demonstrated both the importance of military pressure against armed groups
and the limits of treating territorial recovery as the final measure of
success.
The decisive test is
whether the country can translate operational gains into safer communities,
restored livelihoods, stronger institutions and a public that can trust both
the information it receives and the processes through which security power is
exercised. Buratai’s address placed that challenge before military leaders,
intelligence institutions, policymakers and the defence media, with DECAN
positioned as a forum where the relationship between security and public
accountability must continue to be examined.
🏷️ Tags: Tukur Buratai, DECAN Conference
and Awards, Nigerian Army, Intelligence-Led Operations, National Security
Strategy, Zig Diaries Originals
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